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The Personal Security Account
2000 Plan, Market Outcomes,
and Risk
Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shoven
2.1 Introduction
In early 1997, the 1994–96 Advisory Council on Social Security released
its ﬁnal report, which remarkably altered the nature of the debate in the
United States about the reform of our national retirement system. It did
so by giving legitimacy to recommendations that some element of Social
Security reform should include individual accounts held by workers. The
majority of the council’s members actually advocated such reform. To be
sure, there had been other people andg roups who previously had advo-
cated these types of Social Security reform in this country—but never
before had a group of individuals assembled under an oﬃcial charter by a
presidential administration come close to such a recommendation. Since
the Advisory Council’s report was released there have been several serious
proposals put forward for reforming Social Security that include some ele-
ment of individual accounts. There have also been numerous criticisms of
this approach to Social Security reform.
In this paper, we present a framework for assessing Social Security re-
form proposals by evaluating a speciﬁc reform plan. This plan is one de-
rivedf rom the original personal security account (PSA) plan developed
by the 1994–96 Advisory Council on Social Security (Advisory Council
1997). This plan has been dubbed PSA 2000 and its full elaboration is
presented in Schieber and Shoven (1999). In part, PSA 2000 was devel-
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59oped to respond to some of the criticisms of the original PSA plan (see,
e.g., Ball and Bethell 1998 and Aaron and Reischauer 1998). In section 2.2,
as et of principles around which the plan was devised is brieﬂy stated. In
section 2.3, the proposal is developed and the underlying principles are
developed in somewhat more detail. In section 2.4, we evaluate the long-
term actuarial prospects of the proposal. In section 2.5, we evaluate the
beneﬁts that would be provided under the plan and the risks that individ-
uals would bear with such a partial privatization approach. In the ﬁnal
section, we take measure of the plan against the principles laid out in sec-
tion 2.2.
2.2 Guiding Principles
Thep r inciples underlying the PSA 2000 proposal were developed after
a fairly extensive review of the history of our Social Security system in an
attempt to reﬂect widely held values in this country about the appropriate
design of a reform plan. Obviously, principles alone cannot determine the
details of a proposal, but they can oﬀer guidance to both the engineers
of alternative systems and to the evaluators of proposed solutions. The
principles that the PSA 2000 plan was built around are as follows:
1. The important “safety net” or progressivity of the existing Social Se-
curity system should be preserved.
2. Any redesign of Social Security should enhance the national saving
rate.
3. The disability and early survivor insurance programs within Old-
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) should be preserved.
4. Any reform should oﬀer long-run solvency for the system, not simply
postpone insolvency.
5. Any reform should improve equity between participants (particularly
between one- and two-earner couples).
6. Economic eﬃciency should be increased by increasing the link be-
tween contributions and beneﬁts.
7. The risks borne by individual participants should be diversiﬁed and
kept at tolerable levels.
8. Administrative costs should be kept to reasonable levels.
9. The reforms should be determined and announced as soon as pos-
sible.
The ﬁrst principle stems partially from the desire not to step back from
the single greatest accomplishment of Social Security, namely, the rela-
tively low incidence of oﬃcial poverty amongst the elderly. One of the risks
that Social Security insures against is a bad labor market outcome for
workers during their careers. Bad labor market outcomes can be a result
of poor health, a poor economy, or just lousy luck. There is a general
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whoh ave been unsuccessful in their working careers to live out an impov-
erished old age. The current program oﬀers those with a low lifetime earn-
ings proﬁle a higher replacement rate than those with above-average life-
time labor earnings. The PSA 2000 plan was designed with the intent of
preserving this general pattern.
Thes econdp r inciple is based on the proposition that, just as saving is
the only reliable way for a household to get rich, saving is also the only
reliable way for our country to become wealthier. More wealth for future
Americans translates to higher productivity and higher real wages for fu-
ture workers. The fact that higher national saving would result in signiﬁ-
cantly higher real wages within twenty years was eﬀectively argued by
Aaron, Bosworth, and Burtless (1989). While there is no agreement as to
the exact magnitudes, there is widespread acceptance of the fact that the
pay-as-you-go (or PAYGO) Social Security system has depressed personal
and national saving. Furthermore, providing for retirement is the most
important motive for saving. It is only natural to attempt to increase saving
while restoring the long-run solvency of Social Security.
The third principle, that disability and early survivor insurance should
be preserved, comes from the assessment that insuring these risks is very
important and that Social Security is relatively eﬃcienti np roviding this
coverage. The lack of any signiﬁcant clamoring to replace these elements
of the system with a private alternative suggests that this type of term
insurance should continue to be provided by the Social Security Adminis-
tration. That is not to say that the Disability Insurance (DI) program in
particular shouldn’t be studied carefully for ineﬃciencies. The DI program
itself is underfunded by 20 percent over the seventy-ﬁve-year projection
period used by the actuaries. Before policymakers reallocate any addi-
tional portion of the payroll tax base to the disability program, it is likely
that a full-blown review of the program’s operations will be undertaken.
Thef o urth principle was prompted by the 1983 Social Security Amend-
ments. A nontrivial contributor to the development of a large seventy-ﬁve-
year actuarial deﬁcit since 1983 has been the mere passage of time. Even
with the optimistic projections in 1983, the reformed system ran large
deﬁcits beginning in the second decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century. The
claim was that the program was balanced for seventy-ﬁve years with the
early surpluses ﬁnancing the later losses. The built-in problem was that
with each passing year there was one fewer of the surplus years in the
seventy-ﬁve-year window and one more deﬁcit year. This principle sug-
gests that we should now aspire to a system that is not only balanced over
the next seventy-ﬁve years, but one that appears to be workable thereafter.
The ﬁfth principle deals with the equitable treatment of diﬀerent groups
of Social Security participants. The chief concerns here are the treatment
of one-earner and two-earner households and the adequacy of resources
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isting system are not only defensible but worth preserving; others are not.
Thel arge inequities among two-earner couples, one-earner couples, and
single individuals should be rethought, along with other speciﬁc aspects
of Social Security rules that seem convoluted and inappropriate. For in-
stance, the cliﬀ vesting of marriages at ten years seems arbitrary. Divorced
individuals can claim beneﬁts based on the earnings of their ex-spouses
only if they were married for ten years or more. Finally, since poverty is
greatest among widows, widow and widower beneﬁts should be increased
relative to those for married couples if true retirement income security is
to be achieved.
Thes ixth principle is a very important one. There always has been a
debate about whether Social Security contributions should be thought of
as taxes or deferred compensation—i.e., as pension contributions. The
current system has a relatively weak link between marginal contributions
and marginal beneﬁts and therefore may be viewed by most people as a
tax/transfer system rather than as a deferred compensation pension sys-
tem. For people with covered work histories shorter than ten years and for
many whose careers are longer than thirty-ﬁve years, there is zero marginal
beneﬁt to additional marginal contributions. For secondary earners in two-
earner households, the marginal connection between contributions and
beneﬁts is small or nil. If the full 15.3 percent payroll tax is viewed as a
marginal tax with little or no oﬀsetting marginal beneﬁts, then the distor-
tionaryc o sts of the overall tax system are greatly increased. The total mar-
ginal tax rate for someone in the 15 percent federal income tax bracket is
more than doubled and the eﬃciency costs of the tax system (which go up
with the square of the marginal tax rate) more than quadruple due to the
payroll tax. If marginal contributions and beneﬁts are closely linked, this
can lower the eﬀective marginal tax rate and thereby enhance economic
eﬃciency.
Thes eventhp r inciple is one of the arguments against a purely privatized
system, namely that such a plan has participants—some almost certainly
unknowingly—who bear too much risk with their future retirement re-
sources. Sophisticated investors can manage these risks, but many Social
Security participants may be limited in this regard. This concern can be
greatly reduced or even reversed for a partially privatized plan. A two-tier
system in which everyone has some individual account investments would
almost certainly prove a stimulus for greatly increasing the general level
of ﬁnancial literacy in the general population. At the same time, the tier-
oneo r“ﬂoor” beneﬁts provide protection from truly catastrophic ﬁnancial
results. Both deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) and deﬁned contribution (DC) Social
Security programs are risky. The DB plans bear political risks—i.e., the
government can change the program at any time—as well as macroeco-
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lying risks of ﬁnancial instruments, and we all know that stock and bond
returns are highly variable. The optimal thing to do when you have a situa-
tion in which two diﬀerent designs face diﬀerent kinds of risk is to come
up with a hybrid or “some of each” solution. This follows from the ﬁrst
principles of risk diversiﬁcation.
Thee ighthp r inciple that we should be aware of, administrative costs, is
another type of eﬃciency consideration. Social Security will remain the
primary retirement program for the majority of Americans. It is important
that their contributions not be consumed with high administrative ex-
penses. Any privatization plan or partial privatization plan must be con-
scious of minimizing the administrative costs of the program. That said,
the current program, which is relatively inexpensively administered, pro-
vides very poor information to participants. Annual statements are still
not mailed to all participants, and the statements, which are sent on re-
quest, are misleading. For instance, the only contributions shown on the
statement are the half of payroll taxes attributed to the employee—the
other half, those paid by the employer, are simply missing. Most econo-
mists agree that the employee bears both halves of the payroll tax, and yet
the average participant sees his or her projected beneﬁts and half of his or
her payments to the system. Any private mutual fund or insurance policy
prospectus would be disallowed for failing to disclose fully the cost of the
investment. The PSA 2000 plan is based on a premise that we should cer-
tainly try to control administrative expenses, but better and more informa-
tive communication to participants clearly should also be a goal.
The ﬁnal principle, namely, to do something as soon as possible, stems
from a couple of considerations. First, the Social Security Trustees them-
selves report that the structure of the system is unsustainable after the
third decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century. The one thing we do know, how-
ever, is that there is a tremendous advantage to allowing people time to
adjust to any changes in the beneﬁt rules. Second, there still is time for the
baby boomers to contribute to the solution of Social Security’s solvency—
but that opportunity is dwindling fast. Finally, the passage-of-time eﬀect
keeps bringing the ﬁnancial problems of the system closer and making
them larger with compound interest. The only way to put a check on the
growth of the burden’s being placed on future generations of workers is to
begin making payments on the solution soon.
2.3 The Proposal and the All-Important Details
Theg e neral outline of the PSA 2000 plan is quite simple. First, the pay-
roll tax would remain unchanged from current legislation. That means that
OASDI taxes would continue to be a total of 12.4 percent of annual earn-
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the same for the next several decades. In the distant future it would be
reduced when transition costs were paid oﬀ and the residual trust fund for
the PAYGO-ﬁnanced ﬂat beneﬁt reached 1.5 years of beneﬁts. Just as with
current law, the maximum amount of earnings subject to tax would grow
with the general level of wages.
The beneﬁt side of the program is completely redesigned under the PSA
2000 proposal. There would be two parts to Social Security’s retirement
beneﬁts, a DB part and a DC part. These two parts are often referred to
as the two tiers of beneﬁts with plans such as PSA 2000. The ﬁrst tier
would be a ﬂat beneﬁt for all individuals with a full career of thirty-ﬁve
yearso rm ore. Theﬂ at beneﬁt amount for single people would be $500 per
month in the year 2000. The $500 amount as an initial beneﬁt would in-
crease in the future by an amount reﬂecting the general increase in wage
levels. The second tier of beneﬁts results from the participant’s accumula-
tion in the DC part of the plan. The second tier would be ﬁnanced by
ac ombination of employee contributions matched by contributions from
Social Security.
Workers would be required to contribute 2.5 percent of covered pay up
to the taxable limit on which payroll taxes are due. Social Security would
match the worker’s contribution on a 1:1 basis, providing another 2.5 per-
cent of covered earnings. All told, workers would be accumulating 5.0 per-
cent of their covered earnings in a personal security account. The manda-
tory 2.5 percent employee contribution should not be equated to a tax
increase. The money would be deposited into an account in the worker’s
name, which never happens with tax payments. While workers would have
no discretion about making these contributions, they would have consider-
able control over how the moneys are invested throughout their working
careers and how they are redeemed after retirement. We note that, in cases
where employers oﬀer 401(k) plans with 100 percent matching of employee
contributions, the participation rates in the plans are typically around 80
percent, and are generally somewhat higher for all but the youngest and
lowest-paid employees.
In retirement, workers would have the proceeds of these accounts in
addition to their tier-one beneﬁts. The government’s matching contribu-
tion would not come out of thin air. In fact, it would be a rebate of the
worker’s 12.4 percent payroll tax. After paying the 2.5 percent rebates, So-




We have just described the basics of the proposal in a few short para-
graphs. Obviously, there are many details to the plan. The most important
of them follow in subsections 2.3.1–2.3.13.
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A thirty-ﬁve-year career would be required in order to receive the full
ﬂat beneﬁt of tier one ($500 in 2000, indexed for average wage growth
thereafter) at the normal retirement age. Those with a minimum-length
career, ten years or forty covered quarters, would receive one-half of the
ﬂat tier-one beneﬁt. Those with more than a ten-year covered career would
get an extra 2 percent for each extra year, up to a total of 100 percent.
2.3.2 Normal Retirement Age
In order to receive the full ﬂat tier-one beneﬁt, or even the reduced
beneﬁt resulting from a shorter career, one would have to retire at the
normal retirement age. Under the PSA 2000 plan the normal retirement
age increases by two months per year for the years 2000 to 2011, reaching
the age of sixty-seven years in 2011. Thereafter, further increases are in-
dexed to improvements in life expectancies of people at the normal retire-
ment age.
2.3.3 Early and Late Retirements
As the normal retirement age is gradually advanced, the age of eligibility
fore a rly retirement would also be advanced. Eventually, the youngest age
fore a rly retirement would reach sixty-ﬁve years. At that point, the PSA
2000 plan calls for no additional increases in the early retirement age. The
adjustments for retiring at ages other than the normal retirement age
(NRA) would remain as in the current law. Individuals retiring before the
NRA would face reduced tier-one beneﬁts at the rate of ﬁve-ninths of 1
percent per month. Those choosing to retire later than the NRA would
have their beneﬁts increased by two-thirds of 1 percent per month of delay
in the commencement of beneﬁts.
2.3.4 Earnings Test
Under the current Social Security system, persons who are receiving
beneﬁts have their beneﬁts reduced if they have earnings above an exempt
amount. The reduction is ﬁfty cents for every dollar that earnings exceed
the exempt amount for persons who have not attained Social Security’s
NRA and thirty-three and one-third cents for each dollar for persons who
have. This clearly discourages part-time work for Social Security recipi-
ents. The PSA 2000 plan completely eliminates the earnings test for bene-
ﬁciaries who have reached the NRA.
2.3.5 Spousal Beneﬁts
Spouses would receive the higher of either the tier-one beneﬁts that they
would be entitled to receive based on their own earnings histories, or one-
half of the tier-one beneﬁts of their spouses. Two-earner married couples
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If both partners had full thirty-ﬁve year careers, they would receive a total
of $1,000 per month in tier-one beneﬁts. On the other hand, if one had a
thirty-year career (qualifying for $450 per month) and one had a twenty-
year career (qualifying for $350 per month), their total monthly tier-one
beneﬁts would be $800. Of course, all of these dollar ﬁgures would be
higher in the future since the amounts are for the year 2000 and future
beneﬁts would be increased to reﬂect average wage growth. Since the mini-
mumq ualifying career (ten years of covered earnings) qualiﬁes for one-
half of the full tier-one beneﬁt, all two-earner couples (where both have
qualifying careers) would receive tier-one beneﬁts (and tier-two beneﬁts,
for that matter) based on their own work records. There would be no spou-
sal beneﬁts for the second tier of the system (although the money would
be paid out as a joint survivor annuity rather than a single life annuity).
Further, we think that very few couples in the future would qualify for
spousal beneﬁts for tier one; the vast majority of married couples would
receive beneﬁts based on their own individual work records.
2.3.6 Widow’s Beneﬁts
Currently, many widows and widowers receive two-thirds the amount
that the couple received before the spouse’s death. Under the PSA 2000
plan, the surviving spouse would receive the highest of either her or his
ownt ier-one beneﬁt, the deceased spouse’s tier-one beneﬁt, or 75 percent
of the combined tier-one beneﬁts. The tier-two annuities would be a joint
survivor typew ith the survivorr eceiving 75 percent of the prior amount.
2.3.7 Divorce
Tier-two PSA accumulations would be treated like any other DC pen-
sion plan in terms of dividing the assets in the event of divorce. Tier-one
beneﬁts would be available to divorced spouses only with restrictive rules
similar to those in the current program. It is our expectation that the vast
majority of adults will earn their own tier-one beneﬁts with a covered work
career of at least ten years.
2.3.8 Universal Coverage
The PSA 2000 plan, like existing Social Security, involves redistribution
from those with higher lifetime labor earnings and those with lower life-
time labor earnings. With PSA 2000 the redistribution is transparent. The
tier-one beneﬁt is the same for everyone regardless of wage. However, total
payroll taxes are higher for those who have more earnings. The well oﬀ
paym oref or the system than the not-so-well oﬀ.T h a ti sthe nature of
redistribution. However, a fair redistributionary plan means that everyone
must participate. Otherwise, groups that are well oﬀ opt out, refusing to
help fund the transfers to those who are less well oﬀ.T he bottom line of
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The new group that is brought into the system is all newly hired state and
local government employees.
2.3.9 Annuitization of PSA 2000 Payouts
Social Security beneﬁts are currently paid out as inﬂation-indexed life
annuities, meaning that once a person starts receiving beneﬁts he or she
gets that amount for the rest of his or her life, with annual increases re-
ﬂecting price inﬂation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Thet ier-one PSA 2000 beneﬁts would be paid out in exactly the same
manner. At the time of retirement, one-half of the tier-two accumulation
would be automatically converted into an inﬂation-indexed life annuity.
This half represents the government’s matching contribution to the PSA
accounts. The individuals would be able to choose how he or she would
like to withdraw the other half of the PSA balance. Social Security would
convert it into an indexed life-annuity on the same terms as the other half
of the assets. On the other hand, participants could roll half of their PSA
balances into individual retirement accounts (IRAs) or withdraw the
money in any pattern that suits their needs.
2.3.10 Taxation of Beneﬁts
Thep ayroll tax would continue to be split between employees and em-
ployers. This means that workers would pay tax on half of the OASDI
deductions (their own halves, but not the employers’ halves). Half of the
2.5 percent mandatory contribution to the PSA account would be made
with before-tax dollars and half with after-tax dollars. With this system,
tax would be paid on half of all the money contributed to Social Security
at the time of the earnings. In retirement, 50 percent of the payouts from
both tier one and tier two would be subject to the personal income tax.
This treatment means that the entire PSA 2000 system is taxed according
to consumption tax principles. One way to think about it is that half of
the contributions are treated like Roth IRAs (where after-tax contributions
arew i thdrawn tax-free in retirement) and half are treated like normal
IRAs (where before-tax contributions are taxable upon withdrawal). Tax-
ing half the money going in and half coming out allows people to be diver-
siﬁed over two diﬀerent tax regimes. It is important to note that the fact
that half of the beneﬁts constitute taxable income does not mean that all
retiredp eople will actually have to pay income taxes on this money. Take,
for instance, a married couple who receives $18,000 per year from the two
parts of their PSA 2000 plan. Under the plan, only $9,000 of their PSA
payments would be treated as gross taxable income. However, as of 1998,
am a r r i e dc o u p l ew i t hb o t hspouses over age sixty-ﬁve was not required to
ﬁle a federal income tax return unless they had gross income exceeding
$14,200. Therefore, such a couple could have up to $5,200 of other income
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other income (such as taxable pension distributions and dividends and
interest income) would have to pay income taxes on the $9,000 of taxable
PSA distributions.
2.3.11 Investment Choices and Regulation
The 5 percent tier-two PSA accounts would be funded through payroll
deductions, half from the employee and half from Social Security as a
rebate of the standard FICA tax. Social Security would oﬀer a limited
menu of diversiﬁed investment options: indexed stock and bond accounts,
and one total market account combining stocks and bonds. It is likely
that there would be considerable delays in transferring the money into
the ultimate investment accounts. The government would pay interest on
contributions during the delay period. In addition to the standard
government-sponsored investment accounts, individuals could choose to
place their money with an approved ﬁnancial service provider such as
Vanguard, Schwab, or Fidelity. All of these providers would be required
to oﬀer special investment funds for the PSA accounts. They would be
regulated in terms of the information and service that they provided parti-
cipantsa nd the administrative costs they charged PSA account holders.
The maximum administrative cost would be 1 percent per year. We expect
that competition would force many vendors to provide investment prod-
ucts with much lower costs than that. Individuals would be required to
invest all of their PSA balances with a single approved and regulated ven-
dor, so that there would be a single centralized record keeper, and would
be allowed to change vendors on an annual basis. It is possible that em-
ployers would be allowed to make direct deposits into their workers’ PSA
accounts, thus bypassing the need for the money to pass through Social
Security’s hands.
2.3.12 No Early Withdrawals Permitted
Thet ier-two PSA program would be an essential part of this particular
proposal. No early withdrawals would be permitted from these accounts
fora ny purpose. That means no hardship withdrawals, no withdrawals for
down payments on ﬁrst homes, nor for any other use for the money. The
balances could not be used to collateralize loans and could not be touched
eveni nb ankruptcy proceedings. Individuals would be apt to accept these
restrictions if the rationale for them were explained, namely, that the
money is strictly for the purpose of retirement income provision. The 1:1
match also might make the restrictions more acceptable.
2.3.13 The Phase-In
The new program would be phased in extremely gradually. Current re-
tirees and workers aged ﬁfty-ﬁve and older in 2000 would be covered under
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ated increase in the normal retirement age and the change in the tax treat-
ment of beneﬁts. Half the beneﬁts would be taxable income under the new
program, rather than the current 85 percent for those with taxable income
above $25,000 (single people) or $32,000 (married couples). The net
change for those aged ﬁfty-ﬁve and over in 2000 would be quite small. The
new program would be the only program for those under age twenty-ﬁve
in 2000. They would have at least forty years to accumulate assets in their
5p ercent PSA accounts until becoming eligible for early retirement at age
sixty-ﬁve in 2040 and beyond. Workers who are between ages twenty-ﬁve
and ﬁfty-four in 2000 would get some beneﬁts under the new PSA 2000
plan and some under the existing Social Security rules. The fractions
would be diﬀerent for each age cohort. For instance, someone who was
forty-ﬁve in the year 2000 would get half of the full-career tier-one beneﬁt
and half of his or her beneﬁts from the existing primary insurance amount
(PIA) formula. Someone closer to age ﬁfty-four would have more of his
or her beneﬁts determined the old way, and someone closer to twenty-ﬁve
would have more of his or her beneﬁts determined by the new PSA 2000
plan. With the phase-in, the DB payments from the existing PIA approach
would be essentially unchanged for the ﬁrst ten years. Then gradually
those beneﬁts would be reduced as people began to retire with some of
their beneﬁts determined by the new plan. Beneﬁts under the old plan
would be essentially completed in seventy-ﬁve years, when the twenty-ﬁve-
year-olds of 2000 hit the century mark.
2.4 Static Macroeconomic Balance
Since one of the ﬁrst goals of Social Security reform is to restore the
solvency of the system, the ﬁrst test of any proposal is whether it accom-
plishes this with any degree of certainty. The PSA 2000 plan retains a
largely unfunded DB component to the program. Because 2.5 percent of
covered payroll is used for the 1:1 matching of the individual contributions,
Social Security would have less revenues to work with to meet its DB
promises than under current law. Since the proposal calls for a very grad-
ual transition from the existing program to the new one (with everyone
over the age of ﬁfty-ﬁve retaining their full current beneﬁts), the program’s
DB expenditures would not be immediately lowered. As the new system
matured, current law obligations would diminish. In the very long run, the
only DB promises would be the ﬂat tier-one beneﬁts.
The Actuarial Research Corporation (ARC) has made a seventy-ﬁve-
year forecast of the PSA 2000 plan using the intermediate demographic
and economic assumptions of Social Security. We refer to these forecasts
as the static macroeconomic outlook because they do not take into account
the higher productivity growth that should accompany the higher saving
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rity proposals. The long-run ﬁnances of the system would be more favor-
able with a dynamic model, perhaps signiﬁcantly so. We are planning to
develop such a model. For now, the direction of the bias of not including
such feedback should be noted.
In developing the static projections of the PSA 2000 plan, ARC bench-
marked its valuation of this type of plan by doing a seventy-ﬁve-year pro-
jection of the PSA plan that was developed by the 1994–96 Advisory
Council on Social Security. The Oﬃce of the Actuary at the Social Secu-
rity Administration (SSA) also valued this plan. In their work for the Advi-
sory Council, the SSA actuaries had estimated that the PSA plan would
restore actuarial balance to the OASDI system by the end of their seventy-
ﬁve-year projection period. The ARC valuation of the original PSA plan
suggests that the PSA proposal, as it was speciﬁed by its designers, was
signiﬁcantly underfunded. They estimated that the OASDI trust fund bal-
ance at the end of the projection period would be negative, with the aggre-
gate borrowings at the time being about 7.5 years of annual beneﬁt ﬂows.
TheA RC contends that the Social Security actuaries captured adequately
neither the interaction of increases in retirement ages nor the move to
lower OASDI beneﬁts in the proposal as the reasons for the diﬀerence
between the two sets of projections. Social Security’s actuaries do not nec-
essarily agree with this assessment and have not conceded any problems
with their earlier estimates. The point here is that the ARC valuation of
the PSA 2000 proposal is being done with a model that would appear to
be giving oﬀ very conservative estimates. That is, ARC’s estimates make
the PSA 2000 proposal look much worse than it would under the method-
ologyu sed to assess the original proposal. Our analysis of the PSA 2000
plan utilizes ARC’s projection of the plan supplemented with data, from
the SSA Oﬃce of the Actuary, on the accumulations in the individual-
account element of the system.
Theb asic seventy-ﬁve-year outlook for the Social Security trust fund
under PSA 2000 is shown in ﬁgure 2.1. The trust fund and PSA 2000
accumulations are stated as ratios of assets to the total projected DB pay-
ments. In the initial years, the DB payments are purely current law bene-
ﬁts. As the transition evolves, the DB payments will increasingly become
ab lendb etween accrued beneﬁts under the current system up to the point
of transition plus the tier-one ﬂat beneﬁt accrued under the new system as
it matures. Toward the end of the projection, the overwhelming majority
of the deﬁned beneﬁt will be tier-one beneﬁts paid out of the PSA 2000
system. The lowermost solid line in the ﬁgure is the OASDI trust fund
balance over the projection period. The dashed line is the accumulations
in the PSA accounts each year. The uppermost solid line is the aggregate
of the two.
Thei n termediate-assumptions actuarial forecast for the PSA 2000 trust
70 Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shovenfund is that it would end the seventy-ﬁve-year period about where it
started, with one to two years’ worth of DB expenditures in assets. At the
endo fthe seventy-ﬁve-year period, all of the current-law obligations
would have been honored and the system would be running a substantial
surplus. However, the ratio of trust fund assets to program expenditures
would fall almost immediately upon the adoption of the PSA 2000 plan
and the trust fund would be exhausted by 2022. Under current law, the
Social Security trust funds do not have borrowing authority if their bal-
ances decline to zero. The projection of the trust fund balances in ﬁgure
2.1 portends a problem in that regard under the PSA 2000 proposal. Under
the ARC projections, adjusted to account for the added beneﬁts paid
through the DI program, the trust funds would have negative balances of
about 3.3 years’ worth of beneﬁt payments between 2045 and 2050. To
deal with this potential some sort of special provisions would have to be
made.
Thep rogram as a whole, including the second-tier accounts, would con-
tinuet ob eanet supplier of saving during this entire period, because the
asset buildup in the PSA 2000 tier-two accounts, also shown in ﬁgure 2.1,
would be signiﬁcantly larger than the annual deﬁcits of the DB portion of
the program. The asset trajectory shown for the PSA 2000 accounts in
ﬁgure 2.1 is based on the relatively conservative assumption of a net real
annual rate of return of 4.5 percent on the assets in the accounts. This rate
of return could be earned even if the PSA 2000 accounts accumulated most
(if not all) of the bonds issued by the DB operation during the deﬁcit years.
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Fig. 2.1 OASDI trust fund ratios, PSA 2000 balances, and total asset levelsOne conceivable way to handle the prospect that the OASDI system
would have to borrow funds for some period of time is to construct a
funding mechanism that is internal to the combined structure of the sys-
tem. For example, over the initial years of the programs’ operations, Con-
gress might mandate that some portion of the PSA 2000 accounts must be
invested in bonds issued to provide earmarked funding for the OASDI
transition borrowing. The borrowing in this case would have to equal the
projected trust fund debt associated with the transition to the PSA 2000
plan, plus some additional amount to ﬁnance a contingency fund to
smooth ﬁnancing over business cycles.
It is generally accepted that pay-as-you-go governmental retirement sys-
tems should maintain a contingency fund of around one year’s worth of
beneﬁts. Social Security currently has a balance of nearly two years. In
order to see how the transition might work under a plan of this type we
assume that the OASDI trust fund would maintain roughly its two-year
balance as long as the majority of the baby boomers continue to work.
Beyond that, we assume it would be spent down to between one and one-
and-a-half years’ worth of beneﬁts. Using these assumptions, we estimated
how much of the PSA balances would be required to cover the transi-
tional borrowing.
Ther e sults of our analysis are shown in ﬁgure 2.2. In the initial years,
25 percent of the PSA balances would be invested in U.S. government
bonds. Starting in 2026, we increase the percentage by 1 point per year,
Fig. 2.2 PortionofPSAbalancesinvestedinOASDILibertybondsandtheOASDI
trust fund ratios during the full transition to the PSA 2000 plan
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begin to reduce the required bond holdings as a percentage of total PSA
balances by 1 percent per year. These bonds would be completely paid oﬀ
in 2070. At that point the trust fund balance would be rising steadily and
it would be possible to implement a sizable payroll tax cut.
As a total stand-alone proposal, then, the PSA 2000 plan is balanced
over seventy-ﬁve years and generates additional saving for the economy
for every year in the forecast period. It should be noted that the assump-
tionsb ehind ﬁgures 2.1 and 2.2 do not include using any of the projected
federal government surpluses of the next ﬁfteen years. Presumably, those
surpluses could then be used for other valuable things such as helping
Medicare’s ﬁnances or permitting tax reductions. During his term, Presi-
dent Clinton indicated that a large fraction of the surpluses should be used
to restore the ﬁnancial stability of Social Security and the Republicans for
the most part agreed, we developed an analysis that would dedicate the
surplus to the transition to the PSA 2000 plan. We attribute the projected
surplus to saving Social Security at exactly the same rate as former Presi-
dent Clinton recommended as estimated by the Social Security actuaries
(Goss 1999a).
Ther e sults of our analysis are shown in ﬁgure 2.3. This ﬁgure shows the
eﬀecto ft r ansferring 62 percent of the 2000–2014 surpluses into the Social
Security trust fund and adopting the PSA 2000 plan. Now, under the inter-
mediate assumptions, the trust fund backing the DB promises of the sys-
tem always retains a sizable positive balance. In fact, the balance between
2015 and 2045 hovers between four and ﬁve years’ worth of expenditures
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Fig. 2.3 OASDI trust fund ratios, PSA 2000 balances, and total asset levels after
transferring 62 percent of the 2000–2014 projected budget surpluses to OASDIbefore rising sharply as the obligations of the current system recede. The
total assets in the PSA 2000 accounts and the trust fund reach rather stag-
gering levels by the end of the seventy-ﬁve-year forecasting period—i.e.,
forty years of expenditures. All this indicates is that the PSA 2000 plan
with the infusion of surpluses proposed by Clinton is an overfunded
package.
Of course, there is no shortage of things to do with the extra cash. If we
were truly going to use the budget surpluses to help in the transition fund-
ing, ﬁgure 2.4 suggests that a payroll tax could be implemented as a means
to reduce the cost of the shift to the PSA 2000 plan for workers. The ﬂat
line in the ﬁgure shows the combined payroll tax rate and PSA contribu-
tion to the system without the beneﬁt of the budget surplus ﬁnancing. The
line with three ﬂat steps shows a scenario in which the basic OASDI pay-
roll tax rate is immediately lowered by 0.5 percent because of the beneﬁcial
eﬀecto fu sing someo fthe surplus to support the transition. The rate is
lowered by a total of 1.2 percent, relative to current levels, in 2038 and by a
total of 2.5 percent in 2055. Since the PSA 2000 plan calls for a mandatory
contribution of 2.5 percent of payroll to the tier-two accounts, that contri-
bution would be entirely oﬀset by the permitted payroll tax reduction be-
ginning in 2055. Twenty percent of the contribution would be oﬀset imme-
diately by the 0.5 percent tax reduction. The curved line in the ﬁgure shows
the cost of the current-law beneﬁts if we attempt to provide them using
the current ﬁnancing mechanism. While the PSA 2000 plan would cost
somewhat more in the short term, the long-term cost rates would be sig-
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Fig. 2.4 Social Security cost rates and contributions under the PSA 2000
plan with utilization of the federal budget surpluses to help in ﬁnancing the
transition costsniﬁcantly lower than staying the current course. The infusion of budget
surpluses along with the series of tax cuts would result in a fairly stable
trust fund, as shown in ﬁgure 2.5. The trust fund would range roughly
between 2.0 and 4.0 years’ worth of expenditure, a slightly higher level
than the current ratio.
Ther e sults in ﬁgure 2.4 suggest that over the next twenty years or so,
workers would have to contribute at higher rates than under the current
system in order to get their beneﬁts under the PSA 2000 plan. The problem
with the current system is that it cannot sustain current-law beneﬁt obliga-
tions. The 1999 OASDI trustees’ report estimated that the seventy-ﬁve-
year shortfall in the current payroll tax rate was 2.07 percent of covered
payroll. That means the current tax rate of 12.4 percent would have to go
immediately to 14.47 percent in order to meet the estimated seventy-ﬁve-
year obligations. However, we know that the 2.07 percent increase in the
payroll tax would likely fall short of meeting the long-term obligations of
the program some ﬁve or ten years into the future. Goss (1999b) has esti-
mated that the payroll tax would have to increase 4.7 percent of covered
payt or estore actuarial balance to the system in perpetuity. The ﬂat line
in ﬁgure 2.4 is at 14.9 percent of covered payroll. If the surplus is used to
help cover transition costs to the program, it would bring the total contri-
bution rate down to 14.4 percent of payroll immediately and eventually
allow it to return to 12.4 percent. In the next section of this discussion,
we show how beneﬁts under the PSA 2000 proposal fare compare to cur-
rent law.
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Fig. 2.5 OASDI trust fund ratios, PSA 2000 balances, and total asset levels
after transferring 62 percent of budget surpluses to OASDI and reducing
contribution ratesUsing budget surpluses to give contribution relief to workers will pre-
clude using them in some other fashion. Indeed, there may be other ele-
ments of Social Security that would potentially beneﬁt from them. In the
development of the original PSA plan its advocates proposed that future
DI beneﬁts be held at a level supportable by the current cost rate of these
beneﬁts stated as a percentage of covered payroll. At this rate, the current
beneﬁt structure is underfunded. The PSA proponents, however, felt that
it was unfair simply to assume that additional contributions would be di-
rected to DI without some sort of formal review of the plan. The 1994–96
Advisory Council did not undertake such a review. The net result was that
the PSA plan would result in the scaling back of future DI beneﬁt levels.
This has been one of the major criticisms of the plan (Ball and Bethell
1998; Aaron and Reischauer 1998).
Theb aseline projections of the PSA 2000 plan also assume that future
DI beneﬁts would be ﬁnanced at the rate legislated by current law. One
way the federal budget surplus could be used would be to infuse excess
revenues into the DI trust fund to maintain current-law beneﬁts at current-
law tax rates. The trust fund projections that would result if this were done
without a tax cut are shown in ﬁgure 2.6. Over the projection period, the
combined OASDI trust funds would gradually rise from their level of two
times current beneﬁts to three times annual beneﬁts by the mid-2030s.
They arep rojected to reach 3.6 times annual beneﬁts by 2050 and to de-
cline at a very slight rate beyond the mid-2050s. At the end of the projec-
tion period they would still be at about 3.4 times annual beneﬁt levels. We
believe the contention of the proponents of the original PSA proposal that
DI be reviewed before revenues are added to it merits consideration.
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Fig. 2.6 OASDI trust fund ratios, PSA 2000 balances, and total asset levels by
using part of the budget surpluses to fund DI maintaining current contribution ratesTakena saw hole, the actuarial projections of this section show that the
aggregate ﬁnances of the PSA 2000 program are feasible without counting
on the dynamic gains from the additional saving and without using the
projected federal government budget surpluses. Of course, if the surpluses
were dedicated to a reformed Social Security program, they would permit
other actions such a series of payroll tax cuts or a very substantial im-
provement in the ﬁnances of the disability program. Naturally, any combi-
nation of these two possibilities could be pursued.
2.5 Individual Choice and Individual Risk with Partial Privatization
In this section, we examine the choices and risks that individuals would
face under a Social Security reform along the lines of the PSA 2000 plan.
Theo utcomes are calculated under a very limited set of asset choices. We
presume that the actual menu of options would be larger than those exam-
ined here. The two asset classes we consider are zero-coupon inﬂation-
indexed government bonds and an S&P 500 index fund. We assume that
the government would oﬀer a full array of maturities of zero coupon
inﬂation-indexed bonds. This would allow people to purchase bonds with
diﬀerent maturities at diﬀerent points in their career, each of which ma-
tures upon retirement or upon the anticipated withdrawal date. The gov-
ernment or private investment companies could oﬀer a simple program of
lifecycle acquisition of inﬂation-indexed bonds. This would provide parti-
cipantsa nextremely safe wealth accumulation vehicle. The other asset,
the S&P 500 index fund, is examined here because of the availability of
data regarding the returns on the S&P 500. Index funds have the appeal
of low asset-management expenses. From a pure diversiﬁcation point of
view, a better oﬀering for the actual implementation of a PSA 2000 plan
would be a total market index fund that included the stocks of small capi-
talization and perhaps foreign companies. The S&P 500 index fund, how-
ever, will be used here to gauge the riskiness of stock accumulation in in-
dividual accounts.
We examine the outcomes for someone who is twenty-three years old in
2000 and who participates in the PSA 2000 plan for his or her entire career.
Thei ndividual is assumed to work for forty-ﬁve years, retiring in 2045 at
the age of sixty-eight. It is assumed that the normal retirement age has
advanced to sixty-eight by 2045. The general real wage level is presumed
to improve at the rate of 1 percent per year. The real wages of individual
workers rise at the rate of 2 percent per year due to the accumulation of
seniority and human capital. The inﬂation-indexed bonds are assumed to
yield a real return of 3.8 percent (consistent with the returns on existing
inﬂation-indexed coupon bonds) at all maturities. The gross real returns
on the S&P 500 index fund are determined from the actual 1926–97 obser-
vations chosen in three-year blocks according to a bootstrap statistical
technique. For each forty-ﬁve-year career, ﬁfteen dates are chosen between
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more than once). From these ﬁfteen dates that each mark the ﬁrst year of
a three-year block of returns, we create a simulated sequence of forty-
ﬁve yearso fr ealg ross returns. With this procedure, we generate 10,000
sequenceso fs t ock returns for each case examined in the paper. Both stock
and bond returns are reduced by 30 basis points per year to account for
the costs of managing the individual accounts. This charge for 5 percent
accounts is consistent with the recent estimates of Schieber and Shoven
(2000), James et al. (2000), and Goldberg and Graetz (2000).
Figure 2.7 shows a simulation of the outcomes that this cohort of 2000–
2045 workers would face if they chose to invest all of the money in their
individual accounts in zero-coupon inﬂation-indexed government bonds.
The assumed one percent per year growth in average covered wages means
that the tier-one beneﬁt becomes $782.40 per month (in year-2000 dollars)
by 2045. Of course, the entire PIA formula is also adjusted for the growth
in average real wages. The tier-two beneﬁts are proportional to contribu-
tions. Then o nlinearity in the graph for people with high average indexed
monthly earnings (AIME) is due to the interaction of the ceiling imposed
on covered earnings and the fact that the AIME counts only the highest
thirty-ﬁve years of earnings. Consider someone who has thirty-four years
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Fig. 2.7 Monthly beneﬁts with 100 percent inﬂation-indexed bondsof earnings at or above the cap and someone else who has thirty-ﬁve years
at or abovei t. With our assumed smooth forty-ﬁve-year earnings histories,
these two individuals will have very similar AIMEs. However, the person
with thirty-ﬁve years at the cap will have eleven years of larger contribu-
tionst otheir tier-two account than will the person with thirty-four cap
years( b ecause of the assumed forty-ﬁve-year work career). The result is
that the PSA 2000 beneﬁts appear slightly convex when charted against
AIME.
As can be seen in the ﬁgure 2.7, the PSA 2000 program would oﬀer safe
beneﬁts at least as high as current beneﬁts for all participants with full-
length careers who choose to invest their individual accounts in safe
inﬂation-indexed government bonds and who choose to annuitize their
entire accumulation. We did not model the annuitization process in great
detail. Instead we assumed a very high gender-blended life expectancy at
sixty-eight in 2045 of twenty years and priced the annuities fairly for that
life expectancy. In reality, life expectancy is not likely to have progressed
that much by 2045. However, the conversion to annuities will not be cost-
lessa sm odeled here. We think that our overall results are reasonable pre-
dictions of the likely outcome of annuitized beneﬁts. The results of ﬁgure
2.7 are for single individuals. Under the PSA 2000 proposal, the vast ma-
jority of married couples would receive beneﬁts as if they were two single
individuals.
Presumably most people would invest their tier-two PSA 2000 individ-
ual accounts in a diversiﬁed portfolio of stocks and bonds rather than in
the all-bonds portfolio just examined. Figure 2.8 shows the outcomes for
someone who consistently chooses to invest half of his or her individual
account money in zero-coupon inﬂation-indexed bonds and half in the
S&P 500 index fund. Note that the average outcome is signiﬁcantly higher
than current beneﬁts for all levels of average indexed monthly earnings.
The 25th percentile outcomes are also noticeably better than current bene-
ﬁts. The 5th percentile outcome crosses the current PIA formula at about
$3,250 per month and again at about $7,000 per month, with both
amounts in year-2000 dollars. That means that those whose average in-
dexed annual earnings were between $42,250 and $84,000 would have a
onei nt wenty chance of receiving less under the PSA 2000 plan than under
current law. The poor, who beneﬁt relatively more from the ﬂat tier-one
beneﬁt, would enjoy higher beneﬁts with the PSA 2000 plan with a very
high degree of certainty.
Figure 2.9 charts the outcomes for people who invest their entire indi-
vidual account balances in the S&P 500 index fund. Presumably, such
people are lessr isk averse than most. On average, they do extremely well.
For someone retiring in 2045 with an AIME of $5,000, the mean PSA
2000 outcome would be about 2.5 times current beneﬁts if all of the money
had always been invested in stocks and if stock returns are generated by
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Fig. 2.9 Monthly beneﬁts with 100 percent stocksthe bootstrap procedure just described. However, stocks are quite risky in
the sense that the level of beneﬁts under the PSA 2000 plan would be
highly uncertain for people who put all of their individual account assets
in the stock market. The 90th percentile outcome was so high that we
couldn’t include it on the chart without compressing the scale to an unde-
sirable degree. The 25th percentile outcome is always at least 25 percent
greater than current-law beneﬁts. However, the 5th percentile outcome is
as much as 20 percent less than current beneﬁts. That means that there is
ao ne in twenty chance that the PSA 2000 plan would leave an individual
with less than 80 percent of current-law beneﬁts if he or she invested 100
percent of the funds in his or her individual account in common stocks.
Theﬂ at tier-one beneﬁt helps reduce the overall riskiness of the plan how-
ever, particularly for low-income individuals. In fact, those whose AIME
is less than $2,000 are better oﬀ with the PSA 2000 plan even if they invest
all of their funds in stocks and have the bad fortune to end up with the
5th percentile outcome.
So farw eh avec oncentrated on hypothetical smooth income paths in
evaluating this particular Social Security reform proposal. Of course,
people face uncertainty about their labor income as well as about the re-
turn on their ﬁnancial investments. Next, we evaluate how the PSA 2000
plan compares to the present Social Security system for individuals facing
labor income uncertainty. The process of real labor income growth is now
taken as
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where (t)i sthe growth rate of labor income between t and t  1,  is the
average individual wage growth rate (set 1 percent above the aggregate
wage growth rate for seniority reasons), and u(t)a n de(t)a re standard nor-
mal random variables (zero mean and a standard deviation of one). u is
interpreted as the standard deviation of the permanent shocks on the level
of labor income, while e is the standard deviation of the transitory shock
(again on the level of income). This speciﬁcation is a simpliﬁcation of the
treatment in Campbell et al. (2000). We set  at 0.02 and obtain the magni-
tudes of u and e from Campbell et al. We separately evaluate high school
graduates and college graduates. The speciﬁcation for the u and e pair
of parameters is (0.103, 0.272) for high school graduates and (0.130, 0.242)
forc ollege graduates. These imply that labor income is actually quite vol-
atile.
Figure 2.10 shows the ratio of total PSA 2000 beneﬁts to current-law
beneﬁts for college graduates who would participate in the new plan for
their full careers if it were adopted. Figure 2.10 shows this ratio for those
whoi nvests olely in inﬂation-indexed bonds. The results for high school
graduates are very similar, so much so that it is not worth showing them
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would be at least as great as current beneﬁts with a high degree of certainty
if the individual accounts were invested in inﬂation-indexed bonds.
Figure 2.11 shows the same type of information for college graduates
whod edicate half of their contributions to stocks and half to indexed
bonds. While this diversiﬁed investor can end up with less than current-
law beneﬁts, we had to go to the 1st percentile outcome to get this out-
come. Investors who choose to invest in 100 percent stocks (not shown in
the ﬁgure), of course, take more risks. For them, the 5th percentile out-
come (in terms of these ratios) can be a 10 percent loss and the 1st percen-
tile outcome is roughly a 20 percent loss relative to current-law beneﬁts.
The ﬁnal thing we look at in terms of how individuals would fare with
the implementation of the PSA 2000 plan is how someone would do if he
or she were in mid-career when the plan was adopted. We return to the
case of smoothly rising wages and examine the outcome for someone who
is forty-ﬁve years old in the year 2000 when the plan is hypothetically put
into eﬀect. This forty-ﬁve-year-old is assumed to work until 2022 when he
or she retires at the then-normal retirement age of sixty-seven. This person
will receive half of his or her current PIA beneﬁts, half of his or her tier-
one ﬂat beneﬁt, and the annuitized proceeds of his or her tier-two account.
Figure 2.12 shows the person’s outcomes under the reformed Social Secu-
rity plan and his or her outcomes with current-law beneﬁts. The assump-
tion of this ﬁgure is that all of the tier-two investments are inﬂation-
indexed bonds.
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Fig. 2.10 Ratio of PSA 2000 beneﬁts to current-law beneﬁts for college graduates
with uncertain labor earningsFig. 2.11 Ratio of PSA 2000 beneﬁts to current-law beneﬁts for 50-50 investors
with a college education and uncertain labor earnings
Fig. 2.12 Monthly beneﬁts with 100 percent inﬂation-indexed bonds for someone
aged forty-ﬁve2.5.1 At the Time of the Reform
This person who was in mid-career at the time of the reform may get
lessu n der the reformed plan than with the current beneﬁt structure. The
reason that the mid-career individual does not do as well as those at the
beginning of their careers at the time of the introduction of the new policy
is that the contributions from the second half of a career are less valuable
at the time of retirement than those from the ﬁrst half. The transition plan
of the PSA 2000 plan could be modiﬁed to phase out current beneﬁts more
slowly. For instance, this person who was forty-ﬁve when the new plan was
introduced would be able to match current-law beneﬁts if he or she quali-
ﬁed for 55 percent of current-law beneﬁts rather than the 50 percent speci-
ﬁed by the plan. This slower transition would, of course, cost more money;
perhaps it is another use for the projected federal government surpluses.
Figure 2.13 shows how this same forty-ﬁve-year-old would do if he or
she qualiﬁed for only 50 percent of current-law beneﬁts and invested his
or her tier-two funds 50-50 in stocks and bonds. The dotted line represents
current-law beneﬁts (the PIA formula). Also shown are the 90th percentile
outcome, the mean outcome, the 25th percentile outcome, and the 5th
percentile outcome. Since this person is going to get half of the PIA beneﬁt
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Fig. 2.13 Monthly beneﬁts with 50-50 stocks and inﬂation-indexed bonds for
someone aged forty-ﬁve at the time of the reform
Note: Dotted line represents beneﬁts of the present Social Security program.and half of the full tier-one beneﬁt, the outcome is not as sensitive to
ﬁnancial market outcomes. Both the mean outcome and the 25th percen-
tile outcomes for the individual accounts lead to total beneﬁts closely ap-
proximating current-law beneﬁts. The 5th percentile outcome can be ap-
proximately 10 percent less than current beneﬁts. Of course, this 50-50
investor would also beneﬁt if the phase-out of current law beneﬁts were
slightly slowed to reﬂect the fact that persons with half of their careers
remaining would not be able to accumulate individual accounts half the
size of full-career ones.
Our overall interpretation of the results of this section is that the PSA
2000 plan allows risk-averse individuals to retain beneﬁts at least as high
as current-law beneﬁts. Those who choose to take the risks inherent in
stocks bear some chance of having to live on lower than current-law bene-
ﬁts inr e t irement. These risks are modest, however, and the poor are sig-
niﬁcantly protectedb ythe presence of the tier-one beneﬁts.
2.6 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to assess the riskiness of a partial
privatization plan and to check how it performs with respect to the set of
principles laid out in section 2.2. The main topic has been the risk evalu-
ation.W eh aved escribed a particular partial privatization plan, one that
relies more heavily on individual accounts than do most proposals, and
evaluated its overall actuarial soundness and the outcomes that individuals
would face if it were adopted. The plan passes the actuarial soundness test
and would permit individuals to enjoy safe beneﬁts approximately equal
to current-law beneﬁts if U.S. government inﬂation-indexed bonds were
oﬀered and invested in. If participants invested their tier-two accounts in
common stocks, they would face a small probability of having signiﬁcantly
lessi nr etirement than current-law beneﬁts. However, these risks are re-
duced by the presence of the ﬂat tier-one beneﬁts. This ﬁrst tier is relatively
more important for low-income households; who would enjoy beneﬁts at
least as great as current beneﬁts with a high degree of certainty.
It is not surprising that the PSA 2000 plan performs well with respect
to the principles of section 2.2. That is because these principles provided
the design guidelines for the plan in the ﬁrst place. To summarize brieﬂy,
the ﬁrst-tier deﬁned beneﬁt feature provides an important safety net
against poor investment returns and permits the retention of the basic
progressive structure of the current program (Principle 1). A primary fea-
ture of the program is the mandatory contribution of 2.5 percent of cov-
ered payroll. While these additional contributions would be partially oﬀset
by actions of individuals, there would certainly be a signiﬁcant net increase
in national saving (Principle 2). The disability and early survivor programs
would be retained, and if the same proportion of the projected federal
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located to the program, there would be enough money to cover the long-
run deﬁcit of the disability program (Principle 3). Under all of the scenar-
iosw eh avee xamined, the PSA 2000 plan would be in balance or surplus
after seventy-ﬁve years and would oﬀer the prospects of payroll tax reduc-
tions (Principle 4). Most retiring couples would be treated as two single
individuals, thereby improving the equity between these participant classes
(Principle 5). The tier-two contributions and payouts would be directly
connected. In fact, the tax element of payroll deductions would be reduced
by the 2.5 percent rebate in the form of a 1:1 match of tier-two contribu-
tions (Principle 6). We have examined the risks borne by individuals and
judge them tobetolerable.Inparticular,theamountofriskonebearswould
be am a tter of personal choice. Further, the risks are least for low-income
households (Principle 7). We have written elsewhere about administrative
costs. Here we note simply that the PSA 2000 plan has relatively low ad-
ministrative costs partly, because it has relatively large (5 percent) individ-
ual accounts (Principle 8). We cannot control when Social Security will be
reformed.H owever, there is nothing in the PSA 2000 plan that would delay
implementation seriously.
In this paper, we are not advocating the particulars of the PSA 2000
plan. We are advocating that the riskiness of all serious proposals be evalu-
ated in a manner similar to what we have done here. What is heartening
abouto ur ﬁndings is that a plan that relies heavily on individual accounts
cans t ill be relatively safe for individual participants.
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Comments Steven F.V e n ti
In the last three years no fewer than ad ozen proposals have been oﬀered
to resolve the funding problems of the Social Security system. Most of
these proposals include privately held individual accounts, although the
details vary widely among plans. The Personal Security Account 2000 plan
(PSA 2000) is one of the ﬁrst (derived from the report of the 1994–96
Advisory Council on Social Security), one of the more widely known, and
oneo fthe more far-reaching of these proposals. Most of the plans incorpo-
rating individual accounts that have been advanced restorel ong-term bal-
ance to the system. All proposals help prefund the system. Many of these
plans also increase beneﬁts paid relative to current law in most future
states of the world. Other beneﬁts of individual accounts have been touted
as well, including promoting personal responsibility, increasing awareness
of the need to provide for retirement, and increased national saving and
economic performance. Why has the public been so slow to embrace indi-
vidual account plans?
There are several obstacles to public acceptance. The ﬁrst is that many
of the beneﬁts of a privatized system of personal accounts may also be
available through a variety of public sector arrangements. A second obsta-
cle concerns the ability of an individual accounts system to maintain and
protect the level of redistribution contained in the present system (I will
say a few words about this problem at the end of this comment). A third
obstacle, which is the primary focus of this paper, is the perceived risk
associated with individual accounts. It is alleged that these accounts ex-
Steven F. Venti is professor of economics at Dartmouth College and a research associate
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Personal Security Account 2000 Plan, Market Outcomes, and Risk 87pose participants to more risk—or at least to risk of a diﬀerent sort—than
the present system does. This aspect of Social Security reform mirrors the
ongoing debate between the merits of deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) and deﬁned
contribution (DC) pensions in the private sector. How risky are DC-type
plans? The goal of this paper is to develop a framework for assessing the
consequences of investment risk and to apply this framework to the PSA
2000.
Before turning to this framework, it is useful to highlight a few details
of the PSA 2000. Unlike most other individual account proposals, the PSA
2000 fundamentally changes the Social Security system. It is neither an
add-on to the existing system nor an alternative way of funding the current
beneﬁt structure. After a lengthy forty-year transition period, retirees will
receive an inﬂation-indexed ﬂat beneﬁt and an annuity from an IRA-like
account. Like all proposals, the PSA 2000 must somehow pay for transi-
tion costs. It doess ob ye ﬀectively raising the tax rate to 14.9 percent,
although the authors would argue that the 5 percent of payroll deposited
in the PSA is not a tax since the employee retains control over the invest-
ment. The remaining 9.9 percent covers existing obligations as they are
phased out and the ﬂat beneﬁt that is phased in over the transition period.
In the steady-state, the tax rate will be reduced to the level required to
fund the ﬂat beneﬁt and a little more than a one-year reserve. Note that
the usual transition cost problem—paying for the retirement beneﬁts of
two generations—is a less serious problem for the PSA 2000 because it
never becomes fully funded.
Thee v aluation framework involves simulating beneﬁt outcomes for rep-
resentative individuals with diﬀerent earnings histories and one of three
investment choices: 100 percent indexed bonds, 100 percent equities, and
a 50-50 mix. Uncertain asset returns are bootstrapped from historical dis-
tributions using three-year blocks. On average, the PSA beneﬁt dominates
the current-law beneﬁt at all levels of earnings and for all portfolio choices
(more than double in some cases). However, in some states of the world
thePSAbeneﬁtsfallbelowexistinglawpayouts.Forexample,apersonwith
average indexed monthly earnings of $5,000 would have a one in twenty
chance of faring worse under the 50-50 PSA. The probability is some-
where in the neighborhood of 10 percent for the 100 percent equity case.
How should we expect most potential recipients to respond to the risks
associated with the PSA 2000? The choice between current-law beneﬁts
and the PSA 2000 can be summarized as follows: There exists a safe asset
that provides a rate of return B.Arisky asset with the following distribu-
tion of returns is introduced. It yields more than 0.8B with a probability
of .95, more than B with a probability of .9, more than 1.25B with proba-
bility .75, and more than 2B with a probability of .5. Moreover, losses are
bounded from below (at 0.5B)b ythe ﬂat beneﬁt. If faced with an all-or-
nothing choice, most economists would probably jump at the chance to
88 Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shovenbuy the risky asset. Yet, as the equity premium has taught us, the behavior
of real people is not quite so easy to predict. When faced with the choice
between Social Security plans, many people have (or behave as if they
have) a zero tolerance for risk. Just the whiﬀ of ab ad outcome—beneﬁts
below the currently legislated level—is enough to scare them oﬀ.I fthis is
so, there are some deeper questions about whether such behavior is fully
informed, whether people correctly assess low-probability events, or even
whether choices are rational. In any case, it is my sense that perceptions
of badr etirement scenarios will remain an obstacle to acceptance of the
PSA 2000 (although it is not an issue with some other individual account
proposals). The burden is on the authors to educate people about the prob-
ability distributions of both good and bad outcomes, and the framework
developed here is an important step in that direction.
There are a couple of additional issues that may marginally aﬀect the
beneﬁt projections (and these may be addressed in the more detailed ac-
count of the PSA in Schieber and Shoven 2000). First, the simulations
assume that administrative fees are a modest 30 basis points. This is a
reasonable assumption for large indexed accounts. However, during the
phase-in period, older cohorts will retire with only a few years of PSA
contributions. Given the high ﬁxed costs of servicing accounts, private
ﬁrms may be reluctant to deal with these persons and, if they do, the costs
of servicing these accounts may be quite high relative to the accumulation.
Second, the PSA 2000 requires beneﬁciaries to annuitize one-half of their
PSA balances at retirement. Disposition of the other half is at the recipi-
ent’s discretion. The authors assume that the discretionary component can
be annuitized at the same rate as the mandatory component. With the
possibility of opt-outs, costless conversion to a fair annuity may be
overly optimistic.
In addition to the investment risk addressed above, there are other kinds
of risk associated with individual account arrangements. The PSA 2000
reduces the risk that political forces will change future beneﬁt levels. How-
ever, unlike the current system, the PSA 2000 allows persons to harm
themselves by making bad decisions. Thus some sort of education eﬀort
or safeguards are necessary to minimize this kind of risk. The most obvi-
oush ave already been addressed:T he system must be mandatory, prere-
tirement withdrawals must be prohibited, and fund providers must meet
some minimum regulations. However, persons can also harm themselves
in many other ways: by making bad investment choices, by failing to draw
down equity holdings gradually prior to withdrawal or annuitization, by
falling for pension scams (as in the United Kingdom). It seems clear that
PSA 2000 would need to be accompanied by a massive educational eﬀort
after its introduction.
Nor is the PSA 2000 likely to win political favor among persons intent
on preserving the redistribution inherent in the existing system. The cur-
Personal Security Account 2000 Plan, Market Outcomes, and Risk 89rent system is based on a single formula that provides substantial assis-
tance to low earners and a modest “pension” beneﬁt to others. The PSA
2000 decouples the redistributive and nonredistributive components. The
social assistance or safety net component is explicit. The pension is ex-
plicit. Each is subject to separate political bargaining. The PSA 2000 setup
may make it more diﬃcult to protect the tier-one beneﬁt later on. Future
decisions—should we increase the “base” or the “supplement”?—may
erode the “insurance” component of the program over time. Certainly,
when the market is booming and future retirees project high beneﬁts from
the tier-two component, there will be political pressure to lower the base.
Putting Social Security back on track will be one of the most important
political and economic decisions the country will make in the next few
years. The authors should be commended for their innovative long-term
solution. There are a number of reasons why the PSA 2000 has not yet
been more widely embraced by the public, yetm ysense is that many of
the objections are based more on perception than reality. Thus, providing
as much information to the public as is possible about the distribution of
outcomes under alternative reform proposals is critical for reform to be
successful. Further analyses along the lines of this paper are a start in
this direction.
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